The comitology game: European policymaking with parliamentary involvement

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game

Responsief beleid en kunstmatige intelligentie: grenzen aan het gebruik van technologie

The politics and administration of institutional chang

How implementation affects revision: EU decision-making on changing the posting of workers directive

In this paper, I focus on how national policy implementation affects policy revision at the EU level. The main argument is that when policy is implemented in a decentralized manner, it affects the current situation or status quo in member states. This affects the possibilities of any further legislative change at the EU level. The analyses suggests that heterogeneity in national preferences and homogeneity in national status quo points make it less easy to adopt a revised policy. This result is illustrated by the recent discussion on revising the Posting of Workers Directive. Having rather different views on this policy while faced with limited possibilities to shape this policy nationally, makes it difficult to change the Posting Directive. The rather long and difficult negotiations, especially among the member states, about its revision support this implication.The politics and administration of institutional chang

The politics within institutions for regulating public spending: conditional compliance within multi-year budgets

The politics and administration of institutional chang

Institutionele verandering: naar een bestuurskunde bewegend tussen 'vloeibare' en 'gestolde' voorkeuren

Wetensch. publ. referee

EU policy, domestic interests, and the transposition of directives

Session 1: Governance in the European Unio

What lessons can be learned from the failure to form a government in Bulgaria and the Netherlands?

The politics and administration of institutional chang